Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1975

First Security Bank v. Zions First National Bank :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Don B. Allen; Paul S. Felt; H. Brent Beesley; Ray, Quinney and Nebeker; Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant.
Richard H. Nebeker; Callister, Greene, and Nebeker; Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, First Security Bank v. Zions First National Bank, No. 14010.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1975).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/163

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE

SUPREME COlflfi^S™ Y
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH 0 ^ 031976
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY

I Reuben Clark Law School

FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, )
N.A.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,. Case No.
14010
vs.
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANKJ . f,
/
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the Order and Judgment of the Third
District Court for Salt Lake County
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Presiding

DON B. ALLEN, PAUL S. FELT
and H. BRENT BEESLEY of
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Appellant
RICHARD H. NEBEKER of
. - a J|
if"
CALLISTER, GREENE & NEBEKER jj I
1;
&J'
800 Kennecott Building
a n n s-, n vy- r
Mr r
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
" '"' u
Digitized
by the Howardfor
W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Attorneys
Defendant-Respondent:Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
NATURE OF THE CASE

1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

ARGUMENT

6

POINT I. THERE REMAIN GENUINE ISSUES
OF FACT AND THE POSSIBILITY OF NEW
EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE WHICH WOULD
BE FAVORABLE TO FIRST SECURITY ....

6

POINT II. FIRST SECURITY HAS AN ATTACHED AND PERFECTED SECURITY
INTEREST IN THE TRANSFERRED ASSETS AND IN ALL CASH AND NON-CASH
PROCEEDS ARISING THEREFROM

7

A. FIRST SECURITY HAS AN ATTACHED
AND PERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST IN THE TRANSFERRED ASSETS

7

B. FIRST S E C U R I T Y WAS NOT REQUIRED TO FILE ADDITIONAL FINANCING STATEMENTS TO PROTECT
ITS SECURITY INTEREST IN THE
TRANSFERRED ASSETS

9

C. THE L A N G U A G E CONTAINED IN
F I R S T SECURITY'S AGREEMENTS
WITH SUMMIT AND THE FINANCING
STATEMENT RELATING THERETO
DOES NOT AFFECT F I R S T SECURITY'S PRIOR SECURITY INTEREST IN
THE TRANSFERRED ASSETS
10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
D. FIRST SECURITY HAS A SECURITY
INTEREST IN ANY CASH AND NONCASH PROCEEDS ARISING OUT OF
THE SALE OF THE TRANSFERRED
ASSETS
12
POINT III. ZIONS DOES NOT HAVE TO THIS
DATE AN ATTACHED AND PERFECTED
SECURITY INTEREST IN THE TRANSFERRED ASSETS OR IN THE CASH AND
NON-CASH PROCEEDS ARISING THEREFROM
14
POINT IV. THE BULK TRANSFER LAW IS
NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE WHICH
CONCERNS PRIORITIES OF SECURITY
INTERESTS UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
19
CONCLUSION

21
AUTHORITIES CITED

STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended
16-10-71 (e)
70A-6-103
70A-6-111
~
70A-9-101 et seq
70A-9-108 et seq
70A-9-204
70A-9-306(2)

11,12
20
20
20
15,16
.8,14
.8,12

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
CASES
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. First
National Bank of Blue Island, 504 F. 2d
998, (7th Cir. 1974)
13
Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11
U. 2d 1, 354 P. 2d 559 (1960)

6

Howarth v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corporation, 203 F. Supp. 279 (W. D. Pa., 1962) .... 14
Inter Mountain Association of Credit Men v.
The Villager, Inc.,
U. 2d
, 527 P. 2d
664 (1974)
In Re Posco Sales Co., Inc., 77 Misc. 724, 354
N. Y. S. 2d 402 (1974)

8
9

John Miller Supply Company, Inc. v. Western
State Bank, 199 N. W. 2d 161 (Wis., 1972) .. 18
Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guaranty
Insurance Underwriteis, Inc., 16 U. 2d 211,
398 P. 2d 685 (1965)

6

Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16 U. 2d 30,395 P.
2d 62 (1964)

6

Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank
of Portageville, 358 F. Supp. 317 (E. D. Mo.,
1973)
13
TREATISES
Gilmore, Security Interest in Personal Property,
1965
17
White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code,
West Publishing Company, 1972
20
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,
N.A.,
Plaintiff-Appellant, Case No.
vs.
14010
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a declaratory judgment action regarding the
priority of security interests in merchandise, inventory,
work in process, raw materials and other assets (hereinafter "transferred assets") transferred from Nuclear Controls and Electronics Corporation (hereinafter "Nuclear")
to Summit International Corporation (hereinafter "Summit"). Plaintiff-Appellant First Security Bank of Utah,
N.A. (hereinafter "First Security") and Defendant-Respondent Zions First National Bank (hereinafter "Zions")
each claim a prior and superior security interest in the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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translerred assets and in the cash and non-cash proceeds
arising therefrom.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On February 11, 1975, the Honorable Stewart M.
Hanson, Jr., District Judge in the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, granted Zions' Motion
for Summary Judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
First Security seeks reversal of the Order and Judgment of the Third District Court on the ground that
there are material and genuine issues of fact which must
be resolved at trial, on the ground that there is a possibility of new evidence in this case which would be favorable to First Security and on the ground that Zions is not
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
There has been no determination made by a trier
of fact as to what the actual facts of this case axe. Although some additional discovery would be required prior
to trial, the following sequence of events and related
claims represent the facts as alleged by First Security
and as supported by the Record now before the Court
DECEMBER 5, 1972
Zions entered into an Inventory and Accounts Receivable Security Agreement with Summit (Record, pp.
21-22). At the time the above mentioned security agreeDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ment was entered into, Summit's sole business was the
marketing of calculators manufactured by Nuclear. Summit had no manufacturing activities (Record, p. 17) .
DECEMBER 6, 1972
Zions filed its financing statement relating to the
Summit security agreement with the Utah Secretary of
State (Record, p. 23).
JULY 30, 1973
First Security entered into an Inventory Financing
Security Agreement with Nuclear which covered all of
Nuclear's inventory, including work in process, raw materials and stock in trade, without limitation, and all
after-acquired inventory and any proceeds arising therefrom (Record, pp. 51-52). First Security and Nuclear
also entered into a Security Agreement Covering Revolving Accounts Receivable and any proceeds arising therefrom (Record, pp. 53-54).
JULY 31, 1973
First Security filed its financing statement relating
to the Nuclear security agreements with the Utah Secretary of State (Record, p. 55).
ON OR ABOUT JANUARY 1, 1974
Nuclear owed First Security $831,770.00, which
amount remains unpaid (Record, p. 47). Without the
knowledge or consent of First Security, Trans-Atlas CorDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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pocnation, the parent corporation of both Nuclear and
Summit, caused an inter-company transfer of personnel
and of all assets and inventory pertaining to the manufacture of hand calculators from Nuclear to Summit, The
transferred assets were valued at $2,097,184.00 (Record,
p. 48). There was no consideration for this transfer. The
transfer did not entail the actual movement of physical
asset but was a paper transaction only (Record., p. 17
and Deposition of Jerry W. Dearinger, p. 5). At all times
prior to this transfer, Zions knew that Summit's inventory
consisted solely of completed band calculators (Record,
p. 17). There was no work in process, component parts
or assembly machinery included in Summit's inventory
prior to the transfer by Nuclear to Summit on oar about
January 1, 1974 (Record, p. 17).
Zions was in control of the financial affairs of Summit, and Zions had prior notice or was informed very
shortly thereafter of the transfer of inventory and other
assets from Nuclear to Summit and of First Security's
attached and perfected first priority security interest in
the transferred assets (Record, pp. 17, 48, 49).
On or after January 1, 1974, Zions did not advance
any additional funds to Summit (Record, p. 49).
FEBRUARY 12, 1974
After discovering the transfer of Nuclear's assets to
Summit, First Security entered into an Inventory Financing Security Agreement and a Security Agreement Covering Revolving Accounts Receivable with Summit (RecDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ord, pp. 56-59). These security agreements contained
language drafted by Jerry Dearinger, Summit's attorney,
concerning Zion's security interest in Summit's presently
held accounts receivable.
FEBRUARY 22, 1974
First Security filed with the Utah Secretary of State
its financing statement relating to the Summit Security
Agreements (Record, p. 60).
TO DATE
Zions has managed and maintained control of all
accounts receivable of Summit during 1972, 1973, 1974
and 1975 to date (Record, p. 17). All monies collected
by Summit have been required to be deposited with Zions
where daily balances could be ascertained at all times
(Record, p. 17).
At all relevant times hereto Zions was aware of the
claimed security interests of First Security and was in a
position to protect the security interest of First Security
in the transferred assets as well as its own security interest in certain accounts receivable of Summit (Record,
p. 49).
Zions made no effort to refute First Security's claim
of first priority on the transferred assets until several
months after Zions became aware of said claim and the
assets of Summit had been dissipated (Record, p. 50).
The proceeds from the transferred assets in which
First Security claims a prior security interest can be
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
traced and separated from the assets of Summit in which
Zions has a security interest (Record, p. 50),
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THERE REMAIN GENUINE ISSUES OF
FACT AND THE POSSIBILITY OF NEW
EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE WHICH WOULD
BE FAVORABLE TO FIRST SECURITY.
This Court in Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 U. 2d 1, 354 P. 2d 559 (1960) stated:
A summary judgment must be supported by
evidence, admissions, and inferences which when
viewed in the light most favorable to the loser
shows that, "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Such
showing must preclude all reasonable possibility
that the loser could, if given a trial, produce evidence which would reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor. Id. at 4-5. [Emphasis added.]
In Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16 U. 2d 30, 395 P.
2d 62 (1964), the Utah Supreme Court ruled that:
On summary judgment the adversed partyis
entitled to have the court survey the evidence
and all reasonable inferences fairly to be drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to him.
Id. at 31-32.
This Coin* held in Reliable Furniture Co, v. Fidelity
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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& Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc., 16 U. 2d 211,
398 P. 2d 685 (1965), that the adverse party's:
. . . contentions as to the facts should be considered in the light most favorable to him, and only
if it clearly appears that he could not establish a
right to recovery under the law should such action be taken; and any doubts which exist should
be resolved in favor of affording him the privilege of a trial. Id. at 216-217. [Emphasis added.]
The specific areas where facts are either in dispute or
funther discovery is required are pointed out in the Arguments that follow and are summarized in the Conclusion
of this brief.
POINT II.
FIRST SECURITY HAS AN ATTACHED
AND PERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST
IN THE TRANSFERRED ASSETS AND IN
ALL CASH AND NON-CASH PROCEEDS
ARISING THEREFROM.
A. First Security Has An Attached And
Perfected Security Interest In The Transferred
Assets.
First Security has a valid security interest in the
transferred assets arising from security agreements between First Security and Nuclear which were executed
on July 30, 1973. The financing statement pertaining
to the transferred assets was filed with the Utah SecreDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tary of State on July 31,1973. As stated in Section 70A9-306(2) II C. A., 1953, a security interest continues in
collateral after a transfer:
(2) Except where this chapter otherwise provides, a security interest continues in collateral
notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof by the debtor unless his action was
authorized by the secured party in the security
agreement or otherwise, and also continues in
any identifiable proceeds induding collections
received by the debtor. [Emphasis added.]
In Inter Mountain Association of Credit Men v. The
Villager, Inc.,
U. 2d
, 527 P. 2d 664 (1974), this
Court held that a security interest continues in collateral
notwithstanding its transfer.
Section 70A-9-306 (2) provides that a security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding
sale, exchange or other disposition thereof by the
debtor unless his action was authorized by the
secured party in the security agreement or otherwise, and also continues in any identifiable proceeds, including collections received by the
debtor. Since the financing statement was properly filed, plaintiffs assignor had notice of de' fendanfs security interest in the collateral and
proceeds, as well as the provision in the security agreement that provided that the collateral,
inventory, whenever acquired would secure the
obligation covered, Section 70A-9-204(3) U. C.
A., 1953, as amended 1965. Id. at 670-671. [Emphasis added.]
There appears to be no dispute between First SecurDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Jty and Zions that First Security had a prior and superior
security interest in the transferred assets and in any proceeds arising therefrom up to February 12, 1974
B. First Security Was Not Required To
File Additional Financing Statements To Protect
Its Security Interest In The Transferred Assets.
At the time the transfer became known to First Security, security agreements were entered into between
First Security and Summit to give further public notice
that First Security claimed a security interest in the
inventory and other assets transferred by Nuclear to
Summit. Another financing statement was duly filed with
the Utah Secretary of State on February 12, 1974. As
to Zions, First Security had no duly to file this new
financing statement.
The Utah Supreme Court in Inter Mountain Association of Credit Men v. The Villager, Inc., supra, cites with
approval In Re Posco Sales Co., Inc., 77 Misc. 724, 354
N. Y. S. 2d 402 (1974), to illustrate the principle that the
filing provision of the Code is to give notice and start
investigation.
Although the purpose of the filing provisions
of the Code is to afford protection to a creditor
by furnishing notice to interested parties, these
provisions are intended merely as "a starting
point for investigation which will result in fair
warning concerning the transaction contemplated." [Emphasis added.] [Citation} It was
not intended, therefore, that the interested par-
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ties be completely absolved from any inquiry as
to the past history of the debtor. (See, e.g., Uniform Commercial Code, Section 9-401(3).) Id.
at 671.
The Utah Supreme Court then concludes:
A debtor cannot destroy the perfected security
interest of a secured party by merely changing
its name or corporate structure, particularly
when there is no evidence to indicate that the
secured party had any knowledge thereof. Id. at
671.
The record shows that Zions was aware of the transfer of assets from Nuclear to Summit before or shortly
after it occurred. Inasmuch as the security agreements
and financing statement of First Security pertaining to
the assets of Nuclear were matters of public record at
the time of the transfer, Zions had constructive notice
of First Security's prior security interest in the transferred assets. Further, First Security alleges title facts
will show that Zions had actual knowledge of First Security's prior security interest in the transferred assets
at or near the time of transfer.
Therefore, the filing by First Security of the Summit
security agreements and financing statement was not
necessary to notify Zions, but the filing was done for the
purpose of giving the public additional notice of First
Security's interest in the transferred assets.
C. The Language Contained In First Security's Agreements With Summit And The Financing Statement Relating Thereto Does Not
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Affect First Security's Prior Security Interest
In The Transferred Assets.
The language inserted into the security agreements
between Summit and First Security merely indicates that
First Security was not attempting to claim a superior
position in the assets of Summit "presently subject to
security interest of Zions First National Bank" (language
taken from financing statement). [Emphasis added.] In
other words, First Security was not claiming a first priority security interest in those assets of SUmmit which
were NOT transferred from Nuclear.
The principle of preserving a Hen solely in transferred
assets was reiterated by this Court in Inter Mountain
Association of Credit Men v. The Villager, Inc., supra:
Section 16-10-71 (e) U. C. A., 1953, as amended
1961, does not extend the Men upon the property
of a constituent corporation to the property of
the other constituents or the survivor but merely
prohibits the impairment of the lien upon the
property of the constituent by the merger. The
statute indicates an intent that property acquired solely in connection with the business of
a particular predecessor be treated as though acquired by the predecessor, and be subject to the
lien of that predecessor's mortgage to the same
extent as if it were continuing. If the lien upon
the property of the constituent corporation were
extended as urged by defendant, the rights of
the creditors of the other constituent corporations would be impaired as a result of the merger in violation of the express provisions of the
statute. Id. at 672. [Emphasis added.]
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Thus, First Security could not and did not claim an
interest in the accounts receivable held by Summit prior
to the transfer.
[It should be noted that discovery may show the
so-called "transfer" was a constructive merger in which
case the provisions of Section 16-10-71 (e) U. C. A., 1953,
as amended 1961, would be directly applicable.]
D. First Security Has A Security Interest
In Any Cash And Non-Cash Proceeds Arising
Out Of The Sale Of The Transferred Assets.
Not only does First Security have a security interest in those assets transferred from Nuclear to Summit,
but First Security also has a continuing security interest
in the proceeds arising from the sale of such assets. As
stated in 70A-9-306(2) U. C. A., 1953:
(2) Except where this chapter otherwise provides, a security interest continues in collateral
notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof by the debtor unless his action was
authorized by the secured party in the security
agreement or otherwise, and also continues in
any identifiable proceeds including collections received by the debtor. [Emphasis added.]
First Security's security agreements with Nuclear
and the financing statement relating thereto covered all
proceeds from Nuclear's inventory or accounts receivable.
Neither Nuclear nor First Security haifr received any proceeds from the sale of the transferred assets. These
proceeds have all been appropriated by Zions.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The proceeds from the transferred assets in which
First Security has a first priority position are identifiable
and can be traced by the trier of feet. Tracing in this
matter would be no more difficult than in other cases
where funds have been traced through bank deposits. In
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. First National
Bank of Blue Island, 504 F. 2d 998, (7th Cir. 1974), the
the court, when faced with a similar tracing problem,
stated:
Blue Island [Bank] urges us to follow a statement by Professor Grant Gilmore that proceeds
cease to be identifiable when deposited in a
bank account, so that the security interest is
lost when such commingling occurs . . . Nevertheless, examining the language of the Code, in
the light of its purpose, we conclude that the
more reasonable implication is that the proceeds
may be identifiable, and the security interest
therein survive, even though commingled. Id at
1002. [Emphasis added.]
In Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank of
Portageville, 358 F. Supp. 317 (E. D. Mo., 1973), the court
upheld a security interest in cash arising out of the sale
of automobiles and deposited in the automobile dealer's
bank account. The court held:
The mere feet that the proceeds from the
sales of the six automobiles were commingled
with other funds and subsequent withdrawals
were made from the commingled account does
not render the proceeds unidentifiable . . . Id.
at 324.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In Howarth v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corporation,
203 F. Supp. 279 (W. D. P&., 1962), the court assumed
that if proceeds of collateral could be traced into a bank
account, such proceeds are deemed to be identifiable and
subject to a continuing security interest.
The traoeability of the proceeds of the transferred
assets is a factual question which must be decided by a
trial court.
POINT III.
ZIONS DOES NOT HAVE TO THIS DATE
AN ATTACHED AND PERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST IN THE TRANSFERRED
ASSETS OR IN THE CASH AND NON-CASH
PROCEEDS ARISING THEREFROM.
To be valid, a security interest must attach to the
collateral. Section 70A-9-2Q4(l) U. C. A., 1953, provides
that a security interest attaches where: 1. the debtor
has rights in the collateral; 2. value is given; and 3. there
is an agreement that it attach. Zions' claimed security
interest Mis on all three counts.
1. The extent of Summit's rights in the transferred
assets is a genuine issue of fact. There is much uncertainty as to what exactly happened on or about January
1, 1974, when over $2,000,000.00 worth of assets were
transferred from Nuclear to Summit without any apparent physical movement of goods or without any apparent
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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considenation paid. This entire matter must be explored
through additional discovery.
2. Zions' security interest did not attach to the
transferred assets and/or any proceeds arising therefrom
because Zions gave no value in exchange for a security interest in these assets.
The record shows that Zions made its loan (gave
value) to Summit in December 1972. It is undisputed in
the record that after the transfer of January 1,1974, Zions
advanced no new funds to Summit in reliance upon these
transferred assets or otherwise.
Zions argued in the lower court that its security interest contained an after-acquired property clause and
the original loan given in 1972 was in consideration not
only for Summit's existing inventory and accounts receivable but also for any after-acquired inventory. However, this after-acquired property clause cannot apply to
the transferred assets because these assets were not acquired by Summit in the ordinary course of its business.
Even though the security agreement contains an afteracquired property clause, unless the after-acquired property is acquired in the debtor's ordinary course of business, a security interest will not attach. 70A-9-108 U. C.
A., 1953, states:
When After-Acquired Collateral Not Security for
Antecedent Debt.—Where a secured party makes
an advance, incurs an obligation,, releases a
perfected security interest, or otherwise gives
new value which is to be secured in whole
o r i n p a r t by af ter-acquired property h i s s e c u r i t y
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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interest in the after-acquired collateral shall be
deemed to be taken for new value and not as
security for an antecedent debt if the debtor
acquires his rights in the collateral either in the
ordinary course of his business or under a contract of purchase made pursuant to the security
agreement within a reasonable time after new
value is given. [Emphasis added.]
In the case at bar, Zions made an advance and gave
value which was to be secured in part by after-acquired property. Under 70A-9-108 U. C. A., 1953, Zions'
secuoty agreement in the after-acquired property can
only be deemed to be taken for new value if Summit acquired its rights in such collateral in the ordinary course
of its business. The record shows that the transfer was
not in the ordinary course of business. A book transfer
of $2,097,184.00 worth of inventory consisting mostly of
raw materials, work in process and assembly machinery,
made in conjunction with a shift of Summit's business
from a marketing entity to a manufacturing entity was
obviously not in Summit's ordinary course of business.
Therefore, Zions gave no value for its claimed security
interest in the transferred assets.
3. Zions' security interest did not attach to the
transferred assets and/or any proceeds arising therefrom
because Summit and Zions neither agreed nor intended
that Zions' security interest attach to assets which were
not acquired in Summit's ordinary course of business.
Zions and Summit signed a security agreement in
which they agreed that Zions' security interest should
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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attach to inventory and accounts receivable, including
certain after-acquired property. However, there was no
agreement or intent that the term "after-acquired property" encompass the transferred assets and any proceeds
arising therefrom. Parties to a security agreement must
intend that the security agreement attach to particular
after-acquired property. The intent of the parties is crucial in giving meaning to after-acquired property clauses.
2 Gilmore, Security Interest in Personal Property,
Section 35.5, page 931-932 (1965), discusses the circumstances under which future transactions may be secured
under an earlier made agreement. After acknowledging
that U. C. C. 9-204(5) makes afternacquired property
clauses valid under some circumstances, Gilmore goes on
to state:
However, "covered by the security agreement"
is to be read, Section 9-204(5) should certainly
not be taken to overrule the so-called "dragnet"
cases under the pre-Code law. Legitimate future
advance arrangements are validated under the
Code, as indeed they generally were under preCode law. This useful device can, however, be
abused; it is abused when a lender, relying on a
broadly drafted clause, seeks to bring within the
shelter of his security arrangements claims
against the debtor which are unrelated to the
course of financing that was contemplated by
the parties. In the "dragnet" cases, the courts
have regularly curbed such abuses. No matter
how the clause is drafted, the future advances, to
be covered, must "be of the same class as the
primary obligation . . . and so related to it that
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the consent of the debtor to its inclusion may L
be inferred." The same test of "similarity" and
"relatedness," vague but useful, should be applied to Section 9-204(5). [Emphasis added.]
An analagous case to the present situation is John
Miller Supply Company, Inc. v. Western State Bank, 199
N. W. 2d 161 (Wis., 1972), which involved a dispute
between two secured creditors over the interpretation of
an after-acquired property clause (floaiting lien). The
court ruled that the intent and contemplation of the
parties was important in interpreting after-acquired property clauses:
A "floating lien" security agreement will be
effective according to its own terms, but only if
those terms or the course of dealing of the parties
evidence that the real intent of the parties was
that their subsequent transactions be covered by
the terms of the security agreement. In the instant case, there is nothing to show that the parties ever intended that their security agreement
would apply to future contingent liability on executory contracts between the parties and which
were not similar and not related directly to the
transaction set forth in the original security
agreements. Id. at 165. [Emphasis added.]
Even though Zions' security agreement contains small
print boiler plate language which defined inventory as»
among other things, ". . . raw materials, work in process
. . . ," an examination of the real intent of the parties
disclosed something quite different. Zions did not intend
to rely on Summit's acquisition of Nuclear's transferred
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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inventory and other assets or the resulting accounts
receivable when Zions made the loan in 1972. At the
time Zions made its loan, Summit was not an affiliate of
Nuclear and was solely engaged in marketing hand calculators. Manufoctaing activities by Summit were never
contemplated by either Summit or Zions. Summit's only
inventory consisted of a small supply of finished goods.
It had no work in process, component parts, raw materials or assembly machinery. As Zions could not anticipate the fact that Summit would acquire the transferred assets, Zions was not relying on that transfer
when its loan was made. The Record shows that Zions
looked only to accounts receivable and gave no collateral
value to Summit's inventory.
POINT IV.
THE BULK TRANSFER LAW IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE WHICH CONCERNS PRIORITIES OF SECURITY INTERESTS UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE.
Zions asserted in the lower court that First Security's
remedy in this situation was under the Bulk Transfer Law
and that First Security's decision not to exercise any
remedy it may have had under that section of the Commercial Code (Article 6) estopped any further action.
However, whatever remedies First Security has or might
have had under the Bulk Transfer Law are irrelevant and
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immaterial to this case. A dispute between two secured
creditors is governed by the provisions of Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code which deals with secured transactions (70A-9-101 at seq. U. C. A., 1953).
The limitation of actions section of the Bulk Transfer
Law, 70A-6-111 U. C. A., 1953, specifically states:
Limitation of Actions and Levies.—No action
under this chapter shall be brought nor levy prior
to judgment made more than six months after
the date on which the transferee took possession
of the goods unless the transfer has been concealed. If the transfer has been concealed, actions may be brought or levies made within six
months after its discovery. [Emphasis added.]
Since the present action is being brought under Article
9 and not Article 6, the Bulk Transfer Law has no force
or effect. Official Comment 2 of 70A-6-1G3 U. C. A., 1953,
states regarding the Bulk Transfer Law:
In this code, security interests of all kinds are
regulated by Article 9, Secured Transactions.
Subsection (1) of this Section therefore excludes all transfers for security from the operation of this Article.
In its treatment of the Bulk Transfer Law, White & Summers' treatise, Uniform Commercial Code, West Publishing Company, 1972, states on page 656:
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ferw may have under Article 9 (or other law)
against assets transferred aire not affected by
Article 6.
Therefore, any reliance by Zions on the Bulk Transfer Law in this case is misplaced.
CONCLUSION
I. THE LOWER COURT'S GRANTING
OF Z I O N ' S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
THAT THERE ARE GENUINE AND MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT AND IN THAT
THERE ARE AREAS WHERE ADDITIONAL
DISCOVERY IS REQUIRED, IE.:
A) What was the true nature of the "transfer" from
Nuclear to Summit?
B) What role, if any, did Zions play in engineering
the transfer?
C) What was the intent of the security agreement
between Zions and Summit?
D) What did Zions know about First Security's security interest in the transferred assets at the time of
transfer?
E) When did Zions learn about First Security's security interest in the transferred assets?
F) Why did Zions refuse to lend Summit any adDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ditdonal money after the transfer when Summit's assets
had nearly doubled?
G) When and how did Zions become aware of the
First Security-Summit security agreement and the financing statement pertaining thereto which was filed on February 22,1974?
H) Are the proceeds from the transferred assets
identifiable and traceable?
I) Why did Zions allow the assets of Slimmit to be
dissipated?
II. FIRST SECURITY HAS A FIRST
PRIORITY POSITION IN THE TRANSFERRED ASSETS AND IN ANY CASH OR
NON-CASH PROCEEDS ARISING THEREFROM AS A MATTER OF LAW.
A) Prior to the transfer of assets from Nuclear to
Summit on or about January 1, 1974, it is uncontested
that First Security had a first priority attached and perfected security interest in the transferred assets and in
any proceeds arising therefrom.
B) First Security's security interest in the transferred assets and in any proceeds arising therefrom continued after the transfer from Nuclear to Summit.
C) Language in the Summit financing statement
excepting "assets presently subject to security mterest
of Zions First National Bank" does not reduce or change
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First Security's security interest in the transferred assets
because the transferred assets were not presently subject
to Zions' security interest.
D) The transferred assets were not subject to
Zioms' security interest for the following two reasons:
1. The transferred assets were subject to a preexisting security interest of First Security through
Nuclear; and
2. Zions did not have an attached and perfected
security interest in the transferred assets,
E) Zions did not have an attached and perfected
security interest in the transferred assets or any proceeds
arising therefrom for the following three reasons:
1. Summit's rights in the transferred assets were
and are uncertain;
2. Zions gave no value as required by law when
after-acquired property is not acquired in the ordinary course of business; and
3. There was no agreement between Zions and
Summit regarding a security interest in the transferred assets.
F) The proceeds from the assets of Summit existing
at the time of the transfer and the proceeds from the
transferred assets can be traced and identified by a trier
of fact.
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III. THE BULK T R A N S F E R LAW
DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE AND
FIRST SECURITY IS NOT BARRED BY
THE LIMITATION OF ACTIONS SECTION
THEREOF.
DATED this 23rd day of April, 1975.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

DonB. Allen

H. Brent Beesley
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Appellant, First Security Bank of Utah, NA.
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